Ob jec tives: To con sider the most com mon pri mary care re im burse ment struc tures, to iden tify in cen tives in her ent in each, and to dis cuss how each could be used to en cour age a shared-care ap proach to treat ing men tal dis or ders at the primary care level. Method: Three ma jor fi nan cial re im burse ment mod els-fee-for-ser vice, cap i ta tion, and blended pay ment mech anisms-are ex am ined. Each is con sid ered in terms of its risk-shar ing el e ments and the con se quent in cen tives. We of fer sev eral sce nar ios to il lus trate how the shared-care prac tice model might be en cour aged un d er each fi nanc ing mech a nism. Re sults: The cur rent fee-for-ser vice sys tem does not en cour age shared care. For wide adop tion of the shared-care practice model, there must be a change in the re im burse ment sys tem's in cen tives. While none of the fi nanc ing mech a nisms of fers a per fect so lu tion, each has po ten tial. Each, how ever, must be care fully tai lored to its en vi ron ment. Con clu sions: Fi nan cial con sid er ations are just one as pect to achiev ing shared care. Nev er the less, in de sign ing a sys tem to en cour age col lab o ra tive, co or di nated care for those suf fer ing from men tal ill ness, de ci sion mak ers should be wary of cre at ing or main tain ing ob sta cles (fi nan cial or oth er wise) to pro vi sion of ac ces si ble, high-qual ity care. O ver time, the im por tance of the pri mary care phy si cian's role in treat ing men tal dis or ders has in creased (1). Family phy si cians es ti mate that 20% to 50% of their pa tients have emo tional or psy cho log i cal prob lems (2). In ad di tion, of the 12% of in di vid u als with diagnosable men tal dis or ders who use ser vices, more than 50% re ceive care from a pri mary care phy si cian (3).
O ver time, the im por tance of the pri mary care phy si cian's role in treat ing men tal dis or ders has in creased (1) . Family phy si cians es ti mate that 20% to 50% of their pa tients have emo tional or psy cho log i cal prob lems (2) . In ad di tion, of the 12% of in di vid u als with diagnosable men tal dis or ders who use ser vices, more than 50% re ceive care from a pri mary care phy si cian (3) .
Mean while, a sub stan tial body of lit er a ture sug gests that many in di vid u als re ceiv ing care in the pri mary care set ting do not re ceive ad e quate treat ment for men tal dis or ders.
De tec tion and treat ment rates by fam ily phy si cians re main rel a tively low for prob lems such as de pres sion and anx i ety dis or ders (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) . In re sponse to the grow ing de pend ence on pri mary care to pro vide men tal health care and to the po ten tial for im proved treat ment, sev eral ini tia tives have emergedboth on global and on more lo cal scales-to im prove men tal health ser vice de liv ery in the pri mary care set ting (9) (10) .
These ini tia tives de fine pri mary care broadly: it com prises all ser vices re lated to pre ven tion, as sess ment, and treat ment provided by front-line cli ni cians. In On tario, the Health Ser vices Re struc turing Com mis sion (10) em pha sized col lab o ra tive care with var i ous health care pro fes sion als in volved in the deliv ery of pri mary care ser vices. Its re port stressed that only an in te grated team can suc cess fully pro vide a com pre hen sive range of ser vices. Pri mary care is the point of first con tact for men tal health prob lems; it is also the level at which most services are pro vided for ep i sodes of short du ra tion or low to mod er ate se ver ity. treat ment ar range ments based in the pri mary care set ting. Since ar ti cles ad vo cat ing shared care of peo ple with men tal health prob lems be gan ap pear ing in the sci en tific lit er a ture (11) (12) (13) , Ca na dian in ter est has been high. This is prob a bly due to the coun try's vast ge og ra phy and com par a tively small and dis persed pop u la tion, which has re sulted in many pock ets of un met need and strained psy chi at ric re sources. Shared care is viewed as a re sponse to this sit u a tion: it can po ten tially improve the qual ity of men tal health care by mak ing spe cialty re sources avail able in pri mary care set tings.
Al though it is the o ret i cally at trac tive, sev eral bar ri ers pre vent wide spread adop tion of shared care. Not least among them is the ques tion of fi nanc ing. In deed, fi nan cial struc tures are con sis tently iden ti fied as ob sta cles to any type of pri mary care re form (10,14 -17) . There is lit tle agree ment, how ever, as to which fi nanc ing mech a nism should be im ple mented. This pa per con sid ers the most com mon re im burse ment structures. We ex am ine in cen tives in her ent in each and dis cuss how each can be used to en cour age shared-care treat ment of com mon men tal dis or ders.
Overview of Shared Care
Pri mary care phy si cians, psy chi a trists, and con sum ers have long been dis sat is fied with the split-care ser vice model (18) . The tra di tional re la tion ship be tween pri mary care phy si cians and psy chi a trists, how ever, is still gen er ally not col lab o rative. These dis sat is fac tions, com bined with prob lems of access to psy chi at ric ex per tise, have led to sup port for a ser vice-de liv ery con cept known as "shared-care." Shared care is de fined by a col le gial part ner ship among pri mary care phy si cian and men tal health spe cial ists in which all share respon si bil ity for care. A cen tral tenet of shared care is rec og nition on the part of all pro vid ers that no sin gle pro vider can meet all the pa tient's needs (19) . There are var i ous mod els for link ing men tal health spe cial ists with pri mary care prac tices. These range from shar ing space in the same prac tice with little day-to-day con tact be tween pro vid ers to mod els wherein coun sel lors are fully in te grated into day-to-day care.
A large pro por tion of Ca na dian shared men tal health care liter a ture ex am ines a model known as the con sul ta tion-li ai son model. It is there fore the fo cus of our sub se quent dis cus sions. In this model, men tal health spe cial ists serve 4 func tions, offer ing con sul ta tion, fol low-up, in di rect ser vices, and ed u cation (20) . In On tario, this model has steadily gained at ten tion, mainly in terms of a psy chi a trist li ai son (21) (22) (23) (24) . Through out the coun try there is also grow ing in ter est in us ing advanced-prac tice psy chi at ric nurses to li aise with pri mary care pro vid ers (25) .
Reimbursement Mechanisms and Financial Incentives
There are cur rently sev eral ob sta cles to shared care's widespread adop tion. They in clude pro vider bi ases and prac tice pat terns and so ci etal bar ri ers gen er ated by men tal ill ness-related stigma. Sys tems is sues, such as phy si cian dis tri bu tion, in for ma tion ex change, and re im burse ment mech a nisms, also cre ate sig nif i cant bar ri ers. While all are im por tant and wor thy of at ten tion, our dis cus sion fo cuses on re im burse ment and financ ing. We do not im ply that phy si cians re spond solely to finan cial in cen tives, but the ory and re search sug gest that they have some in flu ence on phy si cian be hav iour (26) (27) (28) (29) .
One key to any re im burse ment strat egy in volves the el e ment of risk shar ing. Who bears the risk of costs and to what ex tent? The en tity bear ing the costs has the in cen tive to con trol them. Risk can be shifted from pro vider to payer or vice versa, depend ing on whether pay ment is made be fore or af ter ser vices are ren dered. Ret ro spec tive and pro spec tive pay ments are reim burse ment meth ods that dif fer ac cord ing to when pay ment for ser vices is made: as their names sug gest, ret ro spec tive pay ment is given af ter ser vices are ren dered and pro spec tive pay ment is given be fore. With ret ro spec tive pay ment, the pro vider is guar an teed re im burse ment for ser vices, and the payer bears all the risk for costs. The payer there fore has a strong in cen tive to con trol costs, whereas pro vid ers have none. Fee-for-ser vice (FFS) re im burse ment is a pop u lar type of ret ro spec tive pay ment.
Con versely, un der pro spec tive pay ment, fi nan cial risk shifts to pro vid ers, who re ceive a set amount for each pa tient be fore know ing what ser vices pa tients will use. If pa tients use few ser vices, the phy si cian makes a profit; if pa tients use many ser vices or high-in ten sity treat ments, the phy si cian faces a loss. Sev eral types of re im burse ment ar range ments fall into this cat e gory, in clud ing cap i ta tion. In the mid dle ground between ret ro spec tive and pro spec tive pay ment falls a mech anism re ferred to as blended pay ment (16) . It com bines mul ti ple pay ment types and shares the risk be tween pro vider and payer.
In this sec tion, we ex am ine FFS, cap i ta tion, and blended payment mech a nisms in re la tion to the pro vi sion of men tal health care in a pri mary care set ting. Con sidering each model, we iden tify who bears the risk and in cen tives each en gen ders.
Ret ro spec tive Pay ment: FFS
In gen eral, FFS fi nanc ing that cov ers costs pro vides in centives for phy si cians to in crease the num ber of pa tients they see and the num ber of ser vices they pro vide. At first, it might seem that a wider range of ser vices in di cates higher-qual ity care. In ter est ingly, how ever, Rob in son notes that US pub lic and pri vate health care pay ers sus pect FFS fi nanc ing of contrib ut ing to costly health sys tem fail ures (30) . It is there fore pos si ble that FFS de creases qual ity of care. For ex am ple, when com mu ni ca tion be tween care givers is not sup ported by FFS, they have no fi nan cial in cen tive to co or di nate care with other pro vid ers or to seek and pro vide con sul ta tions with colleagues. As a re sult, pri mary care phy si cians are not en couraged to ask men tal health spe cial ists for ex pert ad vice and coun sel when treat ing their pa tients with men tal dis or ders. Nor are men tal health spe cial ists typ i cally re im bursed for their time spent dis pens ing such ad vice. In deed, Goldberg observed that with FFS, it is of ten ex tremely dif fi cult for primary care pro vid ers to find psy chi a trists to whom re fer rals can be made (28) . Even when they suc cess fully find psy chi atrists to pro vide treat ment, phy si cians may not be given re ferral out comes be cause psy chi a trists have no in cen tive to take ex tra time to com mu ni cate with re fer ring phy si cians, be yond the oblig a tory ini tial con sul ta tion re ports. Thus, with out reim burse ment for treat ment co or di na tion, there is of ten too little com mu ni ca tion be tween pro vid ers.
Pro spec tive Pay ment: Cap i ta tion
In capitated health care pay ment plans, a lump sum is paid on the pa tient's be half. It rep re sents pay ment for all ser vices the pa tient uses dur ing a set in ter val of time. Re im burse ment repre sents an un der stand ing be tween payer, pro vider, and patient. Usually, the phy si cian re spon si ble for most of the pa tient's care is en ti tled to the capitated fee. The un der standing is that, for a set pe riod of time, the pa tient is as so ci ated with a spe cific pri mary care phy si cian. In con trast to FFS, this means that the pa tient can not nec es sar ily see a dif fer ent physi cian at will. Phy si cians' in comes start at a fixed level and are re duced by the cost of ser vices pro vided to pa tients un der their care. As treat ment costs rise, phy si cian in come de clines. The ob vi ous ben e fit for pay ers is that their health care expenses are capped at a pre de ter mined level.
Be cause phy si cians re ceive a fixed amount for each pa tient, any of the pay ment not spent on pa tient care be comes profit. Con se quently, they have strong fi nan cial in cen tives to re duce the ser vices to each pa tient (31, 32) and to re fer high service-us ers to other cli ni cians (28, 30) . In con trast to FFS, where phy si cians have a fi nan cial in cen tive to pro vide more ser vices, re gard less of whether treat ment is ben e fi cial, cap i tation en cour ages them to serve more pa tients but to pro vide fewer ser vices for each (33) .
Such in cen tives ei ther de crease qual ity by dis cour ag ing the pro vi sion of all-en com pass ing ser vices or en hance ef fi ciency by elim i nat ing ser vices of low value. Some ar gue that cap i tation mo ti vates higher-qual ity care be cause phy si cians enhance ser vices to at tract and main tain a healthy cli ent base and thereby sus tain their de sired in come level (30) . This argu ment makes eco nomic sense given 2 con di tions. First, it is as sumed that the capitated rate is de signed to cover a healthy pop u la tion and is not ad justed for the phy si cian's case-mix. This cre ates the in cen tive to re tain only the health i est patients. In this sce nario high-qual ity ser vices are pro vided to healthy pa tients in an ef fort to keep them, be cause the capitated pay ments are greater than their over all ex pected health care costs. The phy si cian has, at the same time, an incen tive to re sist treat ing those pa tients with chronic con ditions, be cause they are a rel a tively higher-cost pop u la tion (34) . This could be es pe cially det ri men tal to a pop u la tion with se vere men tal ill ness. The sec ond con di tion re quires some com pe ti tion among phy si cians for health ier pa tients: if the phy si cian has a cap tive pa tient pop u la tion, there is no need to com pete for healthy pa tients by of fer ing high-qual ity ser vices (35) . Here, it should also be noted that, while the theory may make sense, cur rent em pir i cal ev i dence is equiv o cal (36); it is un clear how cap i ta tion af fects qual ity.
Pauly com pares dif fer ences in be hav iours as so ci ated with FFS ver sus capitated re im burse ment schemes (32) . In FFS, phy si cians know for cer tain their max i mum loss; it is the cost in curred if no pa tients are treated (in clud ing, for ex am ple, over head costs such as rent, util i ties, and equip ment). With cap i ta tion, phy si cians know for cer tain their in come; it is the to tal cap i ta tion rev e nue less the op er a tional costs of treat ing pa tients and run ning the of fice. In con trast to FFS, with pure cap i ta tion (as op posed to soft cap i ta tion, which will be discussed be low) all fi nan cial risk lies with the phy si cian; the max i mum pos si ble loss is un lim ited (for ex am ple, imag ine that all the pa tients ros tered to a par tic u lar pri mary care group be came se ri ously ill). Phy si cians averse to risk might pre fer FFS to cap i ta tion with the same or higher ex pected in come (32) .
In Can ada, few men tal health ser vices are pro vided on a strictly capitated ba sis. If this mech a nism were in tro duced to pro mote shared care, the first step would be to ad dress the incen tive to se lect only healthy pa tients. This could be done by ad just ing capitated pay ments for the risk as so ci ated with the cov ered pop u la tion. For ex am ple, if a pri mary care prac tice were to see many pa tients with se ri ous men tal dis or ders, its re im burse ment could be in creased to re flect their treat ment costs. Oth er wise, pri mary care phy si cians and their treat ment teams will be fi nan cially pe nal ized for treat ing these pa tients. Nev er the less, it is dif fi cult to im ple ment risk ad just ment success fully (37) . Fur ther, even with ex tremely well-de vised case-mix ad just ment sys tems, pri mary care treat ment teams are still at risk for un usu ally bad years, even though they are fi nan cially pro tected "on av er age." Soft cap i ta tion is a mod i fied ver sion of pure cap i ta tion that seeks to ad dress the prac ti cal lim i ta tions of risk ad just ment. Ways of mod i fy ing a pure cap i ta tion agree ment to pro tect pro vid ers from large po ten tial losses in clude payer-pro vider shar ing ar range ments for profit and loss, plac ing a limit on indi vid ual or ag gre gate pa tient ex pense (for ex am ple, a "stop-loss" pro vi sion), or mak ing ex cep tions for care that can not be pre dicted (for ex am ple, nondiscretionary care) (33) . Soft cap i ta tion's goal is to limit the pro vider's ex po sure to risk and en cour age care pro vi sion for pa tients who might be ex pen sive to treat (for ex am ple, those with chronic men tal ill ness). In fact, in the US, where cap i ta tion is widely used to re im burse men tal health care pro vid ers, the op tion wherein both ser vice pro vider and payer share the risk is more prev alent than is pure cap i ta tion (38) .
Adapted from Folland and oth ers (38) , Fig ure 1 il lus trates the main dif fer ences be tween pure and soft cap i ta tion re im bursement meth ods. On the X-axis is un ad justed phy si cian net income (to tal cap i ta tion pay ments-to tal pa tient costs), and on the Y-axis is ad justed phy si cian net in come, in creas ing in the di rec tion in di cated by the axes ar rows. In a pure cap i ta tion con tract, the pro vider bears all the risk and does not share any gains or losses with the payer. Thus, re gard less of a year's finan cial out come, there is no ad just ment to the phy si cian's income-re cord-break ing prof its or losses are the phy si cian's sole re spon si bil ity. This ar range ment is rep re sented as a 45-de gree line (Line A) from the or i gin. It shows a 1-to-1 rela tion be tween ad justed and un ad justed phy si cian net income; the pro vider bears all gains or losses (which are com pletely de ter mined by the costs of car ing for ros tered pa tients).
Al ter na tively, un der a soft cap i ta tion con tract, pro vider and payer share the risk, and re sult ing wind falls or losses are split on a per cent age ba sis (Note that with pure cap i ta tion, the percent age is 100% for the pro vider and 0% for the payer). This is il lus trated by Line B in Fig ure 1 . In this case, the Y-axis rep re sents the pro vider's net in come af ter ad just ing for the payer's share of losses or gains (that is, ad justed to tal rev enue-to tal costs). As a re sult, the line is tilted to ward the X-axis to re flect the de gree of risk shar ing be tween payer and pro vider: the more Line B bends away from Line A, the more the pro vider is shielded from fluc tu a tions in ei ther gains or losses. For ex am ple, un der a soft cap i ta tion con tract where the payer agrees to ab sorb one-half the risk, Line B would have a slope of ½. If ac tual costs ex ceeded to tal capitated reve nue, the pro vider would only be li a ble for 50% of the shortfall. Con versely, if ac tual costs were less than to tal capitated rev e nue, one-half the gains would be re turned to the payer. In other words, ev ery dol lar lost or gained is split 50/50 be tween the payer and pro vider.
Cap i ta tion can be fur ther al tered to pre vent ex treme vari ations in phy si cian in come. Line B's flat por tions rep re sent "stop-loss" and "stop-gain" pro vi sions. They oc cur at points where the payer wishes to shield the pro vider from any ad ditional losses ("stop-loss") or gains ("stop-gain"). When the pro vider reaches ei ther of these "stop" points, the payer collects or pays 100% of the ad di tional gains or losses. It is impor tant to note that "stop-loss" and "stop-gain" pro vi sions are ad di tional re fine ments that can be in cor po rated into any cap ita tion re im burse ment scheme. For ex am ple, Line A could be drawn to in clude flat por tions sim i lar to those in Line B.
As il lus trated in Fig ure 1 , the re la tion among pure and soft cap i ta tion re im burse ment schemes is re lated to the de gree of risk shar ing be tween pro vider and payer. With risk shar ing, the phy si cian gains or loses less for any given level of un adjusted net in come. Fi nan cial in cen tives as so ci ated with soft cap i ta tion are muted, com pared with those as so ci ated with pure cap i ta tion. This is be cause, un der soft cap i ta tion, pro viders are partly shielded from the fi nan cial re per cus sions of their de ci sions that af fect health care costs. As a re sult, soft cap i ta tion, com pared with pure cap i ta tion, si mul ta neously pro vides less in cen tive for "undertreatment" and for "cost sav ings/ef fi ciency."
Pro spec tive Pay ment: Sal ary
Sal ary re im burse ment is a spe cial case of cap i ta tion wherein "stop-loss" and "stop-gain" pro vi sions are im me di ately engaged. This is il lus trated in Fig ure 1 by the hor i zon tal line (Line C). The line is flat be cause there is no re la tion be tween what the phy si cian is paid (ad justed net in come) and the actual gains or losses ex pe ri enced (un ad justed net in come). Eco nomic the ory pre dicts that sal a ried phy si cians will be paid less than they would ex pect to earn with soft cap i ta tion, on av er age. This is be cause the payer as sumes all the risk by guar an tee ing the phy si cian a fixed in come level. In ex change for as sum ing the risk and pro vid ing a risk-free set in come, the payer can ex tract a pre mium from the pro vid ers re lated to their de sire to avoid risk (risk aver sion). With soft cap i ta tion, phy si cians' prof its de pend on the in ten sity of the pa tient popu la tion's ser vice needs and the ser vices pro vided. If it is a "bad" year, pa tients may need more ser vices and thereby cost more to treat. As a re sult, prof its will de crease, and the provid ers will make less than ex pected. In con trast, with a sal ary, they are guar an teed a set in come, re gard less of how sick the pa tient pop u la tion is dur ing the year. For that guar an tee, the payer can of fer pro vid ers less. With out bo nuses or in cen tive plans, sal a ried health care pro vid ers are com pletely shielded from the fi nan cial re sults of their ac tions. In the ory, they have no fi nan cial in cen tives to in no vate and lit tle in cen tive to work hard.
Blended Pay ment: Capitiation and FFS
Blended pay ment de scribes a re im burse ment method wherein both cap i ta tion and FFS are used to re mu ner ate physi cians (31) . It of fers a mid dle ground be tween the op pos ing in cen tives as so ci ated with ei ther cap i ta tion or FFS alone. Cor rectly bal anced blended pay ment schemes ad e quately com pen sate for time spent pro vid ing needed ser vices for patients, but they do not com pen sate enough to make un nec essary ser vices lu cra tive. Capitated and FFS re im burse ment can be com bined in many dif fer ent ways; the fol low ing 2 exam ples il lus trate their po ten tial flex i bil ity.
In the first sce nario, pri mary care phy si cians are re im bursed by cap i ta tion plus FFS for a spec i fied set of pro ce dures. In this way, health care ser vices for which cost con tain ment is a pri or ity (for ex am ple, ser vices that tend to be over used, such as lab tests) can be re im bursed un der a fixed bud get, us ing cap i ta tion meth ods. For ser vices where undertreatment is a con cern (for ex am ple, ac tiv i ties fre quently not done, such as co or di nat ing care), FFS re im burse ment can be used. The differ ent re im burse ment mech a nisms pro vide dif fer ent fi nancial in cen tives that may fa cil i tate di ver gent goals (for ex am ple, in creas ing some ser vices but de creas ing oth ers). When blended, capitated and FFS re im burse ment cre ate finan cial in cen tives re lated to lev els of re im burse ment and risk shar ing. As Casalino notes, how ever, pay ing FFS only for spec i fied ser vices ig nores the im por tance of the fre quency and length of vis its (31) .
A dif fer ent model pays phy si cians a cap i ta tion fee per pa tient plus FFS at a much re duced rate. Casalino sug gests that approx i mately 70% of phy si cian in come should come from capi ta tion, and 30% from FFS but also re marks that ex act pro por tions have to be de ter mined from ex per i ment and expe ri ence (31). Ostbye and Hunskaar re port that these pro portions were suc cess fully used in pi lot pro jects in Nor way (16) . Al though with this model FFS ac counts for only a small percent age of phy si cian in come, its con tri bu tion, in the ory, is large enough to dis cour age undertreatment but too small to en cour age overtreatment.
Sce narios Using the Re im burse ment Models to Pro mote Shared Care
Cur rently, most psy chi a trists and fam ily phy si cians in Canada are paid FFS for coun sel ling and psy chi at ric ser vices. Pres ent fi nan cial ar range ments of fer lit tle mon e tary in cen tive to co or di nate care. In di vid ual phy si cians may take time from their busy sched ules to try to in te grate care, but they are not re im bursed for treat ment plan ning and co or di na tion. In general, the fi nan cial dis in cen tive for com mu ni cat ing with another care giver equals the re im burse ment phy si cians could have re ceived by treat ing an other pa tient in stead of plac ing phone calls. Al berta, where col lab o ra tion be tween fam ily phy si cians and psy chi a trists is re im bursed, rep re sents a no table ex cep tion.
Cur rently, there is also lim ited re im burse ment (other than through pri vate in sur ance and sal a ried po si tions in pro grams and clin ics) for other nonphysican men tal health spe cial ists, such as psy chol o gists, so cial work ers, psy chi at ric nurses, and oc cu pa tional ther a pists. Yet, re search ev i dence sug gests that men tal health spe cial ists from these dis ci plines are ca pa ble of pro vid ing the same psychotherapies as are phy si cians (39) (40) (41) (42) . Be cause they are not re im bursed by the gov ern ment as in de pend ent prac ti tio ners, it is dif fi cult for them to pro vide ser vices to those in the com mu nity who need men tal health treat ment. From the pa tient per spec tive, there are ad di tional bar ri ers to ac cess be cause out-of-pocket prices sig nif i cantly de ter them from us ing nonphysican men tal health spe cial ist vis its (43, 44) . As with psy chi a trists, full use of these spe cialists is not likely to oc cur in the ab sence of a re im burse ment mech a nism for con sul ta tions.
In the next sec tion, we con sider how each of the fi nan cial mech a nisms dis cussed pre vi ously could be used to pro mote shared care in a pri mary care set ting for those with men tal illness. Due to this pa per's con straints, we do not exhaustively dis cuss all im ple men ta tion pos si bil i ties. In stead, we of fer exam ples of how the con sul ta tion-li ai son shared-care model might be en cour aged. We ex am ine each of the sce nar ios with re spect to how they pro mote pa tient care that is ad e quate, coor di nated, and pro vided by a col lab o ra tive team of pri mary and men tal health spe cialty care pro vid ers.
Sce nario 1: Using FFS to Pro mote Shared Care
Un der the cur rent FFS sys tem, men tal health co or di na tion and col lab o ra tion are not re warded fi nan cially. Al lowing credentialed nonphysician men tal health care pro vid ers to bill for con sul ta tions with fam ily prac tice phy si cians might increase the num ber of con sul ta tions. This would not nec es sarily change fam ily phy si cians' be hav iour, how ever, be cause they are not typ i cally com pen sated for the com par a tively longer vis its that men tal health care re quires.
Al ter na tively, the pres ent re im burse ment sys tem could be changed to al low credentialed nonphysician men tal health care pro vid ers to bill for men tal health treat ments. Un doubtedly, more men tal health treat ments would be pro vided; however, there would be lit tle in cen tive to form the col lab o ra tive net works nec es sary for shared care. Nonphysician men tal health care pro vid ers might share of fice space with fam ily phy si cians, but there would be lit tle fi nan cial in cen tive to work as a team. Po lit i cal re al i ties also ar gue against the success of im ple ment ing this fund ing ar range ment, be cause it ap pears that-at least in the near fu ture-deep po lit i cal and or ga ni za tional is sues will con tinue to out weigh the press ing need to al le vi ate the treat ment short age for in di vid u als with men tal ill ness.
Pros pects for shared care might be en hanced if fam ily phy sicians were al lowed to bill for the coun sel ling and psy cho therapy ser vices of nonphysician men tal health care pro vid ers as so ci ated with their prac tices. Re im burse ment ar range ments might re sem ble those in place for den tists and hy gien ists work ing in tan dem, where den tists are re im bursed for rou tine clean ing done by den tal hy gien ists. In the case of men tal health care, fam ily phy si cians would re fer to their nonphysician men tal health col leagues those pa tients whom they did not feel they had the time or skill to treat.
None the less, be cause of in cen tives in her ent in this model, the schism be tween pri mary men tal health care pro vid ers and psy chi a trists might per sist. More over, it seems likely that this fund ing ar range ment might af fect psy chi a trists' case mix. It might be come more fea si ble and fi nan cially re ward ing for pri mary care phy si cians to treat the mild, non spe cific men tal dis or ders typ i cally pre sent ing in the pri mary care set ting. If these fi nan cial in cen tives were acted upon, psy chi a trists would be left with the most se vere cases, and as a re sult, the se ver ity of their case loads would likely in crease.
The in trin sic in cen tives o f F FS are to in crease the ser vice volume-not to co or di nate care. Shared care will seem eco nom ically vi a ble only when pri mary care phy si cians can re cover its ad di tional costs through rev e nues based on in creased quan tity. Given the maldistribution of phy si cians in gen eral, and psy chi a trists in par tic u lar (45) , re li ance on FFS fi nanc ing in its cur rent form is not en hanc ing op por tu ni ties for shared care. With FFS in cen tives, over worked phy si cians are paid to be too busy to co or di nate care.
Sce nario 2: Using Cap i ta tion to Pro mote Shared Care
A capitated re im burse ment plan could pro vide strong in centives for shared care if it fo cused on the ser vices de liv ered instead of on the pro vider de liv er ing them. For in stance, sup pose that a cap i ta tion ar range ment man dates pro vi sion of men tal health ser vices and that cap i ta tion rates are risk-adjusted for the pop u la tion be ing served. Fam ily prac ti tio ners might con sider form ing prac tice groups that in clude nonphysician men tal health care pro vid ers or psy chi a trists in ei ther full-or part-time ca pac i ties; the pri mary care phy si cian would be re im bursed for the men tal health ser vices re gard less of whether they were pro vided by the fam ily prac ti tio ner, the nonphysician men tal health col league, or in col lab o ra tion with a psy chi a trist. Fi nan cial in cen tives would en cour age primary care groups to pro cure psy chi a trist con sul ta tions or use nonphysician spe cial ists to pro vide ser vices they did not feel they had the time or skill to han dle. Pri mary care phy si cians choos ing not to pro vide men tal health care ser vices would risk los ing pa tients (and their as so ci ated capitated pay ments) to an other pri mary care group with a shared-care pro gram pro vid ing more ser vices. This im plies that cap i ta tion payments would have to be high enough to equal the cost of re ferring some pa tient care to a psy chi a trist, psy chol o gist, or nurse prac ti tio ner (who might be paid at a dif fer ent level than is the fam ily prac ti tio ner).
This sce nario may also lead to fam ily prac ti tio ners' hir ing the least ex pen sive men tal health cli ni cian (for ex am ple, a bach elors' level so cial worker or psy chi at ric nurse), rather than a psy chi a trist or psy chol o gist. At is sue from a pol icy per spective is whether the de lay or lack of treat ment by a men tal health cli ni cian with ad vanced train ing is worse than timely treat ment of fered by health care pro vid ers with less train ing. This trade-off is fre quently en coun tered in ru ral health care.
It should be noted that whether or not cap i ta tion rates are case-mix ad justed, there re main fi nan cial in cen tives to at tract health ier pa tients. These pa tients are "safer" fi nan cial risks be cause their po ten tial costs vary less. Thus, even when case-mix ad just ment is state-of-the-art, the risk in tro duced with pro spec tive pay ment fre quently re quires that pure cap ita tion schemes be mod i fied. Payers ea ger to pro mote shared care might con sider us ing soft cap i ta tion pay ment plans with risk re duc tion re lated to the de gree to which their ob jec tives are met (for ex am ple, ini ti at ing and fol low ing shared-care mod els). Like wise, sal a ried phy si cians might be given in centive bo nuses based on the ex tent to which they par tic i pate in shared-care net works.
Sce nario 3: Using Blended Pay ment to Pro mote Shared Care
Given that a large, rad i cal change in the phy si cian re im bursement sys tem is im prac ti cal, blended pay ment sys tems may rep re sent the most prac ti cal way of cre at ing fi nan cial in centives to pro mote shared care. Blended pay ment builds on the al ready ex ist ing FFS sys tem and in tro duces the con cept of shared care through cap i ta tion: it is the com pro mise so lu tion. It po ten tially com pen sates phy si cians in a man ner that produces in cen tives to share care, while re duc ing in cen tives to pro vide un nec es sary ser vices.
The blended pay ment sys tem is a mech a nism en dorsed by the On tario Med i cal As so ci a tion (46) and used in Brit ish Co lumbia's pri mary care dem on stra tion pro ject (47) and in pri mary care in many parts of Eu rope (35) . It is also be ing used in hospi tals and As ser tive Com mu nity Teams, where psy chi a trists are paid ses sional fees for such in di rect ser vices as con sul tation while they con tinue to bill FFS for di rect pa tient care. A blended pay ment sys tem, where pri mary care phy si cians are paid a capitated fee in ad di tion to FFS at a re duced rate, has much to rec om mend it, if op ti mal fre quency and length of visits for pa tients with men tal dis or ders are to be achieved.
Guar an teed in come from cap i ta tion pay ments could sub sidize the use of men tal health spe cial ists in the pri mary care prac tice. These spe cial ists could as sist in, or com pletely provide, men tal health ser vices. The cap i ta tion would also free the phy si cian from be ing wholly ser vice-ori ented. As a re sult, it would en cour age fam ily prac ti tio ners to spend more time co or di nat ing care with other pro vid ers. The abil ity to re ceive FFS re im burse ment in ad di tion to a capitated fee would counter act the fi nan cial in cen tive to undertreat. For ex am ple, the FFS com po nent could off set the ef fort re quired by the fam ily prac ti tio ners to seek spe cial ist con sul ta tions. To be ef fec tive, the FFS re im burse ment rate should be set at a level that discour ages bill ing for un nec es sary con sul ta tions but is high enough to en cour age con sul ta tion.
A ma jor lim i ta tion of any sys tem us ing cap i ta tion, how ever, is that it in tro duces the need for some type of pa tient ros tering: pa tients must be at tached to a sin gle pri mary care prac tice for a set amount of time. This re stric tion may lead to a perceived loss of choice on the part of the pa tient. In the end, it may pres ent a sig nif i cant bar rier to this type of model (35) , which would need to be im ple mented care fully.
Conclusion
Re im burse ment schemes have in her ent fi nan cial in cen tives, and we leave the ex tent of phy si cians' re sponse to fi nan cial in cen tives for oth ers to de bate. In this ar ti cle, we have ex amined FFS, capitated, and blended pay ment schemes. Based on the fi nan cial in cen tives as so ci ated with these re im burse ment meth ods, we sug gest sce nar ios un der which shared men tal health care could be pro moted in a pri mary care set ting. Finan cial con sid er ations are just one as pect of the over all pol icy en vi ron ment. In seek ing to de sign a sys tem that en cour ages col lab o ra tive, co or di nated care for those suf fer ing from mental ill ness, de ci sion mak ers should pay par tic u lar at ten tion to ob sta cles (fi nan cial or oth er wise) to the pro vi sion of ac ces sible, high-qual ity care.
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